For many years, different American presidents chose not to start a war with Iran. The reasons for their caution are now becoming clearer as events unfold.
In the harshest interpretation, President Trump decided to go to war because he had an almost unshakable belief in himself. He seemed to think that the serious risks that stopped earlier presidents from attacking Iran simply wouldn’t apply to him. The dangers were well known, but he believed that somehow things would turn out differently because he was the one making the decision.
In a more generous interpretation, Trump may have believed that the worst predictions about attacking Iran were exaggerated. A short conflict that took place earlier when Israel and the United States struck Iranian military targets appeared to show that Iran could be attacked without triggering a massive and disastrous response.
After those strikes damaged Iran’s military facilities and protests spread among its own population, the Iranian government looked weaker and more isolated than before. From that point of view, it might have seemed like an opportunity. If Iran was already struggling, perhaps a stronger push could finally defeat a dangerous enemy that has long been hostile to the United States and its allies.
That argument might sound convincing at first. But there is a problem with it. For more than twenty years, experts in the United States have studied the possible consequences of military action against Iran in great detail. Governments, military planners, and analysts spent years examining what might happen if the U.S. launched strikes there.
The careful planning and preparation are part of the reason the opening phase of the war showed such impressive displays of American military strength. However, those same studies also warned about serious risks that could follow: oil prices could surge around the world, violence could spread across the Middle East, and civilians could be killed in tragic incidents such as the reported U.S. missile strike near an Iranian elementary school.
When earlier presidents decided not to start a war, it wasn’t because they were avoiding a tough decision. They were holding back because they knew how easily the conflict could spiral out of control. So the current problems should not be surprising; many of them were predicted long ago.
One major issue is geography. The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow waterway that connects the Persian Gulf to the rest of the world. At its narrowest point, it is only about 35 miles wide, and Iran sits on three sides of it. This passage is extremely important because about one-fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas travels through it.
That means Iran has the ability to disrupt global energy supplies even without winning a traditional military victory. If Iran begins attacking oil tankers or threatening ships that pass through the strait, shipping companies and insurance firms may decide the route is too dangerous. Even small, occasional attacks could be enough to scare companies away and drive up energy prices worldwide. Geography alone gives Iran a powerful way to respond during a war.
Another challenge comes from the nature of Iran’s government itself. The Iranian regime is a religious system that often praises martyrdom and has spent decades preparing for what it believes is an inevitable conflict with the United States. At times, large protests inside Iran make it seem as if the government might collapse.
Many observers hope that public anger will eventually bring it down. But the regime has repeatedly shown that it is willing to use extreme violence to stay in power. It has already killed many of its strongest opponents. That brutality makes it very difficult for protesters to overthrow the government. By the time outside forces start talking about supporting a revolution, the regime may have already crushed the groups most capable of leading one.
Some people hope that military strikes and economic damage will weaken the government enough that new protests will erupt after the bombing stops. But so far, attempts to remove the leadership have only resulted in one hard-line leader being replaced by another. Reports suggest that the current leader’s son, who could succeed him, holds equally extreme beliefs and sees harsh actions as justified by religious conviction.
Because air strikes alone are unlikely to remove the government from power, an important question remains: how does the conflict actually end? After the experience of the Iraq war where the United States struggled to manage the country after overthrowing Saddam Hussein it seems that the Trump administration may have concluded that planning for the aftermath is almost pointless. When asked what will happen next, Trump has often given unclear or contradictory answers, sometimes even within the same statement.
One possible outcome is that the United States might try to find a group within Iran’s government willing to negotiate a deal that benefits Washington. In other words, instead of overthrowing the system, the U.S. might try to reach an agreement with certain officials who want to preserve their own power while ending the conflict.
But that kind of outcome would contradict the promises made to Iranian protesters who hoped for outside support in removing the regime. It also doesn’t help that, after nearly two weeks of fighting, there is still no obvious Iranian figure who could realistically play that role, and the government in Tehran has not shown signs of surrendering despite the pressure.
By announcing extremely ambitious goals—such as forcing Iran to surrender completely or replacing its government Trump may have unintentionally made it easier for Iran to claim success. If the regime survives at all, it can present that survival as a victory. At the same time, the United States has no clear endpoint for what was originally described as a short military operation. If the real goal had simply been to weaken Iran’s ballistic missile program, the U.S. could have limited its strikes to missile launchers and production facilities.
After doing that, the administration could have declared the mission accomplished and ended the operation quickly. Another option might have been to let Israel carry out most of the attacks, with American support behind the scenes, which might have reduced the broader regional consequences.
If the true objective was to remove the Iranian government, the United States could have spent more time organizing and supporting opposition groups inside the country so they would be stronger and better prepared to challenge the regime. Instead, the decision was made to go straight to war while ignoring many of these possibilities. Now the predictable consequences of that choice are beginning to appear.
